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SPEECH
BARRIERS TO UNITED STATES-CANADIAN TRADE:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, THE UNITED
STATES PERSPECTIVE
RICHARD W.

I.

PARKER*

INTRODUCTION

The United States and Canada are poised on the threshold of a
truly historic set of negotiations which, if successful, will achieve
almost total freedom of movement in goods and services
between the two countries. The significance of this undertaking
can only be gauged by the volume of trade already moving
between the two countries, despite considerable impediments on
both sides. United States exports to Canada last year accounted
for around twenty-two percent of our total exports, while over
seventy-five percent of total Canadian exports were to the United
States. I am told that the volume of trade between the United
States and Ontario alone exceeds the level of U.S. trade with our
next largest trading partner, Japan.
A successful free trade area (FTA) is certain to expand and
diversify this already enormous volume, benefiting consumers
and enhancing the competitiveness of U.S.-Canadian production
in an increasingly competitive global market. Such are the benefits of cooperation in trade. At the same time, no one is proposing a merger of the two economies. Both sides will continue to
retain a measure of autonomy in their own domestic markets.
The challenge for negotiators is to agree on an appropriate balance between integration and autonomy: deciding whether, in
* Associate General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative.
J.D., 1985, Yale Law School; Ph.D., 1982, Oxford University; B.A., 1978, Princeton University. The views expressed are those of the author only, and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Office of the United States Trade Representative.
Mr. Parker presented this speech on April 11, 1986 at the 80th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C. The text of the speech is
protected under copyright by the Society and will be reprinted in the Society's
proceedings.
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what areas, and to what degree the agreement shall displace or
modify the national laws and policies of the parties.
This afternoon I would like to share with you my view of the
key U.S. objectives for the bilateral agreement and then discuss
the likely relationships between this agreement and three
different sets of pre-existing norms: international law as
reflected in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), U.S. domestic law, and the laws of the states or provinces. These are the relationships which both sides will focus on
as they seek an agreement that properly balances autonomy and
integration.
In the course of the discussion, I will have frequent occasion to
refer to U.S. experience with the U.S.-Israel FTA, which went
into effect in 1985. This is not to say that Canada and Israel are
interchangeable as partners for free trade. Obviously, liberalizing trade with Canada will.affect a vastly larger volume and diversity of trading interests. This means, inevitably, that the
Canadian FTA negotiations will be longer and more complicated
involving tougher negotiations over higher economic stakes than the U.S.-Israel talks.
Nevertheless, the Israeli talks represented the first U.S. experience with the negotiation of free trade areas; they were conducted from the outset as a possible precedent for a Canadian
agreement, and they were subject to identical constraints in
domestic and international law. That agreement serves as a useful point of reference for several of the issues I will address
affecting the evaluation of proposals for liberalized U.S.-Canadian trade.
II.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

The first, most obvious objective - in these as in the Israeli
talks - is to eliminate tariffs on the widest possible range of
traded goods and services. Canadian tariffs average between
eight and nine percent, as compared to U.S. tariff levels averaging three to four percent. On both sides, these relatively low
average figures conceal substantially higher tariffs in key sectors.
In these sectors, even the mundane business of tariff reduction
posesses formidable obstacles to agreement.
The second broad area of concern is nontariff barriers on trade
in goods, maintained at both the federal and provincial level. A
major challenge in this area will be agreeing on what are nontariff barriers, as distinct from valid health, safety, marketing
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and/or consumer regulations or permissible uses of established
trade remedy laws. Canada, for example, insists that U.S.
application of antidumping or countervailing duty law to Canadian imports is a nontariff barrier. Canadians call it "contingent
protection." Needless to say, Americans do not share this view.
In addition to the definitional dilemma, both sides must confront the fact that important areas of trade are regulated by
independent or quasi-independent regulatory agencies and/or
states or provinces. Each side must find a way to bind or obtain
the voluntary cooperation of these separate entities if the comprehensive objectives of the agreement are to be obtained. I will
return to this difficult issue in a few moments.
Third, the negotiations must resolve four particular issues
involving Canadian practices if the end result is to be acceptable
to the U.S. Congress. These are: (1) Canadian subsidization of
timber exports; (2) Canadian provincial discrimination against
U.S. brands in the marketing of alcoholic beverages; (3) inadequate Canadian protection of U.S. patents and copyrights; and
(4) Canada's policy of reviewing and (possibly) forcing divestiture of U.S. companies investing in the "cultural" and energy
sectors. Negotiations are currently underway on all but the last
of these issues, and it is hoped that the issues can be resolved
amicably outside the context of the FTA negotiations. In any
case, the FTA discussions must resolve them.
Finally, both sides are seeking an agreement which will liberalize trade in services, such as insurance, aviation, leasing, construction and engineering. A successful agreement in this area
would not only offer important economic benefits to the two
sides but also could serve as a model and a catalyst for the inclusion of services in the new GATT round of multilateral talks.
The goal will be to achieve national treatment and open market
access in as many service sectors as possible. Defining these principles in particular contexts, however, will be a challenge. A
larger challenge will be persuading independent regulatory agencies and/or political subdivisions to alter their own regulations
and practices to conform to the terms of the agreement.
III.

PROBLEMS

We now come to the difficult questions of the relation of any
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bilateral agreement to multilateral, domestic, and state/provincial law. The way these questions are answered will largely determine the balance between autonomy and integration implicit in
the agreement.
Both the United States and Canada are committed to negotiating an agreement which is fully in accordance with the letter and
spirit of internationally agreed rules of trade embodied in the
GATT. The GATT generally requires nations to abide by the
most-favored-nation principle if they enter into a customs union
or free trade area which removes tariffs and quantitative restrictions on "substantially all" trade between the joining parties.
The removal of barriers need not happen all at once - it may be
staged in over a period of years, as in the U.S.-Israel FTA - but
substantially all trade must eventually be covered.
To date, GAT practice offers no clear guidance as to the content of the "substantially all" requirement. On one extreme, the
European Economic Community recently tried to claim that its
citrus preferences for certain Mediterranean countries could be
rationalized by labeling the arrangement a "free trade area." We
rejected that characterization. On the other hand, the U.S.-Israel
FTA, which provided for the reduction of tariffs on all traded
goods by 1995, and which preserved an express option of quantitative restrictions only on small volumes of traded agricultural
products, clearly qualified as a free trade area under the "substantially all" criterion. Between these extremes there is a gray
area over which legal scholars could haggle. No proposed free
trade area has ever been rejected by the contracting parties of the
GATF for failure to meet the "substantially all" test; but neither
the United States nor Canada have any interest in undermining
this already weakened standard. The two sides will seek a comprehensive agreement as a legal necessity, as well as an economic
desideratum.
A more difficult issue is the relation of a U.S.-Canadian agreement to U.S. domestic law. It is a truism of U.S. law that only the
U.S. Constitution has the legal capacity to invalidate subsequent
legislation. No treaty or executive agreement with Canada can
strip Congress of the legal authority to pass inconsistent subsequent legislation.
However, as a political matter, Congress is understandably
reluctant in principle to pass legislation which could violate an
international commitment. The fact that any agreement would
probably trigger a Canadian right of compensation or retaliation
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could only add to this reluctance. This is the sense, and the only
sense, in which the existence of an FTA might insulate Canada
from future so-called "protectionist" legislation. It is, however,
by no means insignificant.
What about the relation of the FTA to existing U.S. law, particularly in the area of trade remedies? Once again, the provisions
of the U.S.-Israel FTA provide a useful reference point. In the
U.S.-Israel negotiations, Israel argued long and.hard for a bilateral mechanism to review U.S. application of countervailing and
antidumping laws. Israel sought similar bilateral review for
United States use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which
authorizes consultation and/or retaliation against practices which
the President finds to be discriminatory, unjustifiable, or unreasonable. Israel also asked for a partial exclusion of Israeli products from Section 201, which provides relief against surges of
imports that are found to have caused substantial injury to U.S.
firms. Under the Israeli proposal, the President would be barred
from including Israel in general relief from such injurious
imports unless first determining that Israeli imports, in and of
themselves, were a cause of substantial injury to U.S. products.
Despite the small size of Israel and the correspondingly diminished threat of Israeli exports to U.S. commercial interests, Congress responded to these particular requests with a categorical
"no". Section 406 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, passed
while the negotiations with Israel were in full swing, provided
that "no trade agreement with Israel . . . may affect in any manner or to any extent the application to any Israeli articles . . . of
any provision of law under which relief from injury caused by
import competition or by unfair trade practices may be sought."
Moreover, U.S. negotiators in each instance insisted on terminology which preserves the full range of the President's discretion in
each case, rather than on terminology which binds the President
by agreement to exercise discretion in a certain way. Frankly, I
would be surprised if the two sides were able to agree on a binding bilateral mechanism to review either party's application of its
trade remedy laws.
IV.

SOLUTIONS

This conclusion has important implications for the choice of a
dispute settlement process. Obviously, a dispute mechanism
cannot be binding and address itself to a party's trade remedy
laws without effectively displacing those laws to a significant
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extent. From the U.S. point of view, U.S. trade remedy law particularly the countervailing duty and antidumping laws applies internationally-agreed standards of conduct through fair
and objective hearing procedures. Importers' interests already
are adequately protected. Congress will not accept a bilateral
dispute settlement mechanism with authority to review an application of our countervailing duty and antidumping laws. On the
other hand, it is equally clear that some sort ofjoint committee is
necessary and proper to supervise implementation of the agreement. Some sort of dispute settlement mechanism is needed to
resolve differences of opinion between the two sides as to how
the agreement should be interpreted, and/or to resolve claims by
one side that actions of the other (though perhaps technically
legal) have undermined fundamental objectives of the agreement. In this mode, formal mechanism for notice, consultation
and resolution of disputes could do a valuable service for both
sides.
One of the most interesting and difficult issues in the talks will
certainly be how to handle the federal character of both nations.
The issue arises particularly in the areas of services, sale of alcoholic beverages, and government procurement because states
and/or provinces have traditionally wielded considerable regulatory authority (and autonomy) in these areas.
In Canada, the issue of provincial authority has a "constitutional" dimension, if you will, which is absent from the U.S.
scene. The U.S. Congress, unlike the Canadian Parliament, has
full legal authority to adopt agreements and pass laws which displace state laws in areas of traditional state function.
This legal distinction, however, misses the fundamental point.
As a practical and political matter, it is unthinkable that either
side would enter into an agreement binding on the states or
provinces in these areas without the full consent and cooperation
of those states or provinces. Getting that consent and cooperation is going to require a great deal of sensitivity, a great deal of
consultation and a great deal of domestic diplomacy on both
sides. In each case the object will be to find ways that states or
provinces can preserve their autonomy, their individuality, and
their fundamental regulatory objectives, without discriminating
against or unnecessarily burdening foreign participants.
This is much easier said than done. Regarding services, for
example, how does one distinguish between a valid health and
safety or commercial purpose and a discriminatory regulation,
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considering that standards in this area are often necessarily subjective and that the thing being measured or evaluated is
invisible?
In the end, it may turn out that the best we can hope for is
some sort of "best efforts" pledge with regard to states, similar
to the kind we achieved in the U.S.-Israel Declaration on Trade
in Services. Nonetheless, we are committed at this stage to seeking something more in the U.S.-Canada context, and we are
encouraged by the forthcoming responses of the state representatives we have consulted with thus far. If the provinces turn out
to be equally forthcoming on the Canadian side, I think we can
anticipate an agreement, even in these particularly difficult areas,
which will be of considerable benefit to both sides.

